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Abstract: While views may differ on the factors that made the 2011 Egyptian revolution possible, 
the role of mass media will remain undisputable. The Internet-based social networks caught the 
Mubarak regime by surprise, and the popular disillusionment with the ‘national’ media led the 
public to turn to private newspapers and satellite channels for keeping pace with the events. This 
paper examines the role of specific media during the 18 days of the 2011 Egyptian revolution – from 
25 January to 11 February, 2011 – which we have divided into four parts. It discusses how these 
media contributed to the unfolding of events, conceptualized the protests and the demands of the 
public, and presented the actors that participated in or opposed the revolution. These points are 
addressed by discussing the content of the Facebook pages of the Sixth of April Movement and We 
Are All Khalid Said, as well as that of a private Egyptian newspaper, al-Shuruq, and the state-run 
newspaper al-Ahram.1  
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Introduction: The Media and State-Citizen Relationship 
 
Egyptian mass media have contributed significantly to the 2011 Egyptian 
revolution. ‘National’ media, including government-controlled TV channels and 
newspapers, were used by the Mubarak regime to manipulate public opinion. 
Other media, such as the Internet, private newspapers and satellite channels, 
played an important role in mobilizing people and updating them on 
developments. The role of these new media can be understood within the larger 
context of how developments in mass media have influenced the relationship of 
                                                 
1 This paper was presented in the conference Covering the Arab Spring, Middle East in the Media – 
Media in the Middle East at the University of Copenhagen on 1-2 September, 2011. We would like 
to thank the conference organizers, Ehab Galal and Riem Spielhaus, as well as the two reviewers of 
Global Media Journal (German Edition) for their useful comments and suggestions.  




states and their citizens, particularly in Egypt and similar countries.  
 
As Price Monroe (1996:8) rightly notes, “[c]ontrol of . . . tools of mass information 
and persuasion [is] central to the idea of a commanding state.” Mass media in 
most Arab countries used to be under the tight control of Arab governments, which 
used them to control and manipulate news they chose to make public. In Egypt, 
state-run mass media are called the ‘national media,’ suggesting that they were run 
by and meant to serve the people. However, with the revolution in information and 
communication technology of the 1990s, the state’s monopoly of mass media was 
challenged, and new media provided alternative sources of news to the public, 
diminishing thereby the power of commanding states to manipulate public 
opinion.  
 
At this point, Arab states were faced with a dilemma. Stifling new information and 
communication technologies would deprive them of benefiting from these 
lucrative inventions. Permitting them, however, could threaten their authority 
(Kedzie and Aragon, 2002:5). Some Arab governments succeeded in exercising 
some control over these media, for which reason some analysts questioned their 
effectiveness in democratizing Arab countries (Sakr, 2001:207). 
 
Mubarak’s Egypt was among the first states in the region to launch its own 
national satellite in 1998 (Nilesat 101) and did not impose restrictions on the 
Internet, thinking that raising the ceiling of freedom of expression may limit the 
threatening effect of new media. However, new media were changing the 
relationship between the state and its citizens. Rather than “manufacturing 
consent” (Herman and Chomsky, 1988), they contributed to the creation of a new 
Arab political culture based on a “more liberal, pluralist politics rooted in a vocal, 
critical public sphere” (Lynch, 2006:2). They created a “public sphere” that eluded 
the control of the state and provided its members with relative security and 
freedom.2 The Internet in particular has had great potentials for mobilizing people 
and coordinating political activities, an environment that can contribute to 
democratization (Allison, 2002; Cairncross, 2001; Rheingold, 2002). As Hofheinz 
(2005:96) has argued, the Internet has created  
 
“a dynamic of change that is helping to erode the legitimacy of traditional authority 
structures in family, society, culture/religion, and also the state, and thus creating pressure 
for reform. Slowly and not without setbacks, but in the end inexorably, young people are 
claiming ‘private’ spaces of freedom that are influencing their social attitudes. In the face of 
this process, ideas on the relations between state, society, and the individual that may have 
been generally accepted for generations are changing, and the Internet is the medium 
where such change is often most vigorously expressed.” 
 
                                                 
2 Habermas’s concept of public sphere refers to a combination of institutions and practices that 
mediate between private interests and the realm of state power. It is a space where individuals 
meet, discuss common public affairs, and organize themselves against abuse of social and public 
power (Kellner, 1992:4-5). The media, more specifically the printed media, has facilitated the 
functioning of public spheres and established its democratic influences.  




In addition to the Internet, this paper sheds light on the role of ‘traditional’ mass 
media – the press in this case – during the Egyptian revolution. The discussion of 
how these media covered the 18 days of the Egyptian revolution benefits from 
framing analysis, which assumes that the news is not made up of random coverage 
of events, but is rather a specific process of selection and construction (Gitlin, 
1980; Gamson, 1975; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989). Frames define problems, 
diagnose causes, make moral judgments, and suggest remedies. In short, they 
emphasize salient aspects of issues, reflecting thereby the perspective of the media 
source. Thus, it is useful in examining the underlying motives of choosing, 
reporting and framing events in a certain way and how this seeks to affect public 
opinion. In addition to observing differences in the way issues were framed across 
media outlets, change and continuity in media frames during the 18 days of the 





The sample of this paper comprises two Facebook pages and two Egyptian 
newspapers (both are in Arabic). 
 
The Sixth of April Movement and We Are All Khalid Said 
 
Calling itself the Egyptian resistance movement, Harakat Sitta April, or the Sixth 
of April Movement (hereafter, the April Movement), branched off from Kifaya 
(lit., enough), an opposition movement that appeared in 2005 primarily to 
campaign against the election of Mubarak for a fifth term and grooming his son to 
succeed him. A group of Kifaya’s young members decided to start their own 
movement, which was named after its successful support of a strike by textile 
workers on the 6th of April, 2008. Its membership included activist groups in 
various parts of Egypt, and it was among the main organizers of protests in the 
three years preceding the revolution.3  
 
Kulluna Khalid Sa‘id, or We Are All Khalid Said (hereafter, Khalid Said), is a 
Facebook page that was established by Wael Ghonim–Google’s marketing 
representative in the Middle East, whose identity as the administrator of the page 
was revealed only during the revolution. The page was established after the death 
of Khalid Said, an Egyptian youth who was apparently brutally killed in Alexandria 
in June 2010. Said’s family and eyewitnesses claimed that he died while being 
beaten by two security agents trying to arrest him, allegedly because he videotaped 
a police officer exchanging drugs with a drug dealer. The Ministry of the Interior 
insisted that Said chocked on a piece of marihuana when the agents were arresting 
him. These agents were put on trial, but it was evident that the regime was trying 
to avoid their conviction. Said’s family was harassed and state-run newspapers 
                                                 
3 Materials used in this paper were accessed on the Facebook page of the Movement 
(https://www.facebook.com/#!/shabab6april) in the period from the 3rd to the 25th of August, 2011. 




published reports about his moral corruption. The trial sessions became occasions 
for Said’s family, friends, and sympathizers to condemn the corruption and cruelty 
of the Egyptian police, as symbolized by Said’s disfigured face. We Are All Khalid 
Said soon attracted many followers, and it may have been the first to call for the 
25th of January protests.4  
 
Al-Ahram and Al-Shuruq 
 
Established in 1875, al-Ahram (hereafter, Ahram) is one of the oldest daily 
newspapers in Egypt. It is published by the gigantic al-Ahram Establishment. In 
the early 1960s, it came under the control of the Egyptian government and became 
part of the ‘national press.’ Since that time its editors-in-chief were chosen 
carefully by the state. For years it was seen as the mouthpiece of the Egyptian 
government, but perhaps because it provided more diverse views than other 
newspapers, it maintained relative popularity in Egypt.  
Established in 2009 and published by the prominent publication house Dar al-
Shuruq, al-Shuruq5 (hereafter, Shuruq) is an Egyptian private newspaper that was 
able to bring on board a number of famous writers representing a wide range of 
views in the Egyptian political arena. Some of these writers were expelled from 
Ahram after long years of service, such as the liberal Salama Ahmad Salama, who 
became Shuruq’s editor-in-chief, and the famous Islamist writer Fahmi Huwaydi. 
After the revolution, some younger columnists in the newspaper were appointed to 




The Media and the 2011 Egyptian Revolution 
 
In what follows, the content and coverage of the selected media are examined in 
the context of four stages that we have distinguished in the course of the Egyptian 
revolution.6 Before discussing the actual content of these media, we give a brief 
description of the major events that took place during each stage. 
 
First stage: Before Tuesday, January 25, 2011  
 
The period before January 25 witnessed a huge mobilization campaign on the 
Internet seeking to encourage as many people as possible to participate in the 
planned protests. Inspired by the Tunisian revolution, on January 16 the April 
Movement posted on its wall that it text-messaged members of the Egyptian 
government warning them that they may soon join the Tunisian President who fled 
his country a couple of days earlier. Ahmad Maher, General Coordinator of the 
                                                 
4 Materials used in this paper were accessed on Kuluna Khalid Said’s Facebook page 
(https://www.facebook.com/#!/ElShaheeed) in the period from the 3rd to the 25th of August, 2011. 
5 Often spelled ‘Shorouk’ by Dar al-Shorouk. 
6 PDF copies of all issues of Ahram and Shuruq are available on http://www.ahram.org.eg/ and 
http://www.shorouknews.com/ respectively. 




Movement, urged the Egyptians to “walk the road of the Jasmine revolution and 
follow the example of the Tunisians who gained their rights by unity and 
perseverance” (https://www.facebook.com/#!/shabab6april?sk=wall). Thus, 
although the Movement mentioned fixing a minimum wage rate, ending the state 
of emergency, firing the Minister of the Interior, and bringing to justice police 
officers who committed crimes against the Egyptian people as their demands, 
removing Mubarak from power seems to have been entertained by it. However, 
although it used the term revolution on the 24th of January (one day before the 
planed protests), Khalid Said’s page pointed out that the aim of the protests was 
not to overthrow the regime overnight, but to force the government to listen to 
popular demands. It spoke generally about the necessity of changing the 
philosophy of ruling, focusing on political and economic grievances of Egyptians, 
such as the emergency laws, the dictatorship of the regime, the double standards in 
enforcing the law, as well as the deteriorating economic conditions.  
 
Both pages used innovative strategies to prepare for the protests. To create 
confidence among the Egyptians that change was both possible and eminent, the 
April Movement used national songs and online posters and distributed 30000 
leaflets across Egypt to encourage people to join the protests to restore their rights. 
It posted photos of people demonstrating since 2003, commenting, “We can, yes 
we can, with hope and honesty, we can” 
(https://www.facebook.com/#!/shabab6april?sk=wall). On January 19, another 
statement said, “I’ll sleep and wake up on a new dream: Egypt, for sure, is 
returning back to me” (https://www.facebook.com/#!/shabab6april?sk=wall). It 
contacted fans of popular sports clubs, workers, doctors, lawyers, engineers, 
university professors and teachers to join the marches. On January 17, it 
mentioned that it contacted Egyptians abroad to organize parallel protests in front 
of Egyptian embassies and consulates. The positive replies it received convinced 
the Movement that the 25th of January, the date of the planed protests, would be 
unprecedented. Khalid Said’s page, however, focused primarily on using 
technology to advertise the protests. On January 17, it called for a campaign of text 
messages and encouraged contacting mass media and celebrities to spread the call 
for protests. Its members were encouraged to use posters advertising the planned 
protests as their Facebook profile picture and to share videos and photos uploaded 
on the page with friends and family members. 
 
A few days before the protests, both pages mentioned details about the points and 
times of assembly along with some instructions. They sought to organize 
simultaneous marches in all Egyptian cities. The April Movement posted phone 
numbers in ten governorates to provide people with information and details about 
the event. It urged Egyptians to be “one heart” and political powers to avoid 
divisive slogans and banners. Khalid Said’s page suggested some slogans, avoiding 
provocative religious or political statements that the security forces can use to 
blame the protests on any political or religious group. It provided phone numbers 
of lawyers affiliated with the ‘Front of Defending Demonstrators,’ although it 




stressed that participants must remain peaceful and resist police provocation.7 
This emphasis on the brutality and corruption of the security apparatus explains 
the significance of choosing the 25th of January to protest. This day is (perhaps 
now, ‘used to be’8) the Egyptian Police Day, which commemorates the massacre of 
a police force while resisting the British occupation forces in January 1952, an 
event that aroused the anger of the Egyptian army and led to the 23rd of July coup 
against King Farouq in the same year. Realizing the symbolic significance of this 
day, the two pages agreed that the message that the protests would carry to the 
police would be, “we reject torture, repression and indignity, and will not remain 
silent anymore” (https:www.facebook.com/#!/ElShaheed?sk=wall).  
 
All this planning and the choice of a national holiday made the April Movement 
confident that the 25th of January was going to be a turning point in modern 
Egyptian history, although Khalid Said’s page was conservative in its expectations 
of the outcome of its “electronic struggle,” despite the thousands of its members 
who vouched to participate in the protests. 
 
Prior to the 25th of January, Ahram was almost silent on the planned protests. It 
focused instead on a terrorist attack on a church in Alexandria on New Year’s Eve, 
which killed and injured dozens of Copts. When covering news about the Tunisian 
revolution, it had an obvious interest in stressing that Egypt was targeted by 
external actors seeking to destabilize it. When Mubarak was attending the 
celebration of the Police Day in the Police Academy on the 24th of January,9 the 
Minister of the Interior announced that the perpetrators of the Alexandria attacks 
were connected with the ‘Palestinian Islamic Army.’10 In his speech, Mubarak 
reiterated that Egypt was targeted and urged the Egyptians to show solidarity 
against these threats. When reporting this on January 25, Ahram only highlighted 
a statement by the Minister of the Interior that the planned protests were 
organized by “immature youths” who had no real influence (Ahram, 25/01/2011).  
On the other hand, Shuruq took an obvious interest in the potential repercussions 
of the Tunisian revolution on the rest of the Arab world and on Egypt in particular. 
Reporting the fleeing of the Tunisian President on the 14th of January, it quoted 
various Egyptian political activists calling for civil disobedience (Shuruq, 
15/01/2011). Under a headline that read, “Egypt speaks Tunisian,” it reported 
“celebrations” by Egyptians everywhere for the success of the Tunisian revolution 
(Shuruq, 16/01/2011). It spoke about a “Tunisian tsunami” that was sweeping the 
                                                 
7 On the eve of the protests, Khalid Said’s page reminded its members that the Ministry of the 
Interior had warned that the police would use force against unauthorized protests. It warned that 
the police might send thugs to start clashes between the protesters and attack public and private 
properties to provide police with a pretext to crack down on the demonstrators.  
8 A controversy did take place in the weeks prior to the 25th of January in 2012 over whether this 
date should still be celebrated as the Police Day in addition to being the anniversary of the Egyptian 
revolution. To avoid any provocation to the “revolutionary forces,” the Ministry of the Interior 
decided to keep its celebrations to a minimum.  
9 The Police Academy was officially known as Mubarak Academy for Security. Remarkably, the trial 
of Mubarak, his sons, and top officials of the Ministry of the Interior are held there. 
10 The media campaign against Hamas during 2010 had prepared the stage well for this accusation. 




Arab world, where most leaders were taking measures to avert the contagious 
nature of the Tunisian revolution (Shuruq, 17/01/2011). It reported incidents of 
Egyptians setting themselves on fire, following the example of Mohamed Bouazizi 
who set the first spark of the Tunisian revolution in December 2010 (Shuruq, 18 
and 19/01/2011).  
 
On the 21st of January, Shuruq began to report news about the protests of the 
Police Day. It mentioned that some 60000 internet activists vouched to participate 
in a “revolution against torture, poverty, corruption, and unemployment,” as some 
participants pointed out. Kifaya, the ‘Popular Parliament,’11 and some political 
movements announced their commitment to participate, whereas other groups 
were still undecided. The Muslim Brotherhood did not announce that they would 
participate as a political movement, but its members were given the choice to 
participate according to their wish. The leader of the opposition socialist Tagammu 
Party announced that it was “inappropriate” to protest during the Police Day, 
whereas a leader in the Nasserist Party questioned the seriousness of the protests, 
Shuruq reported (Shuruq, 21/01/2011).  
 
The following day, Shuruq continued its coverage of the regional impact of the 
Tunisian revolution and the increasing number of ‘Bouazizis’ in Egypt. In an 
obvious insinuation about his popularity, it reported a pro-Mubarak protest in 
which some 200 people participated. A complete page in this issue was devoted to 
the planned protests on January 25, including information about We Are All 
Khalid Said and the Sixth of April Movement. It mentioned the suggested points of 
assembly in Cairo and the insistence of the organizers on the peacefulness of the 
protests. It also presented what it described as the demands of the organizers of 
the protests, which included fixing a minimum wage rate, supporting the 
unemployed, dismissing the Minister of the Interior, releasing political prisoners, 
as well as dissolving the parliament and amending the constitution to limit the 
presidency to two terms (Shuruq, 22/01/2011).  
On January 23, Shuruq reported that several political forces were preparing for the 
‘Day of Rage’ on January 25 (Shuruq, 23/01/2011). On the 24th, it reported that the 
protests were going to take place in several Egyptian cities simultaneously and 
would include workers, university students, as well as fans of popular Egyptian 
football teams. Furthermore, while the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) 
was amassing thousands of persons to respond to the protests, protesters were 
preparing shields to protect themselves from the security forces. The Muslim 
Brotherhood claimed that they received threats from the police (Shuruq, 
24/01/2011). On January 25, Shuruq’s headline read, “The Day of Rage.” In 
addition to a description of “plans for attacks and defense” suggested by the 
protesters, it reported the participation of the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
rejection by the Salafists to take part in the protests (Shuruq, 25/01/2011).  
                                                 
11 The ‘Popular Parliament’ was established by some Egyptian opposition leaders after the rigged 
parliamentary elections of 2010. Remarkably, it was mocked by Mubarak in his first and last speech 
before the new parliament in November 2010, when he said, “Let them have fun.”  




Second stage: From Tuesday, January 25, to Friday, January 28, 2011 
 
On Tuesday, January 25, thousands of Egyptians took to the streets in various 
parts of Egypt. Clashes with the police, at times violent and deadly, occurred, and 
seem to have ignited the spark of a massive popular uprising. The situation abated 
slightly on Wednesday and Thursday, when organizers of the protests were 
focusing their efforts on preparing for Friday, the 28th of January. This Friday was 
a turning point in the course of the revolution. In addition to the unprecedented 
number of protesters, they now had one specific demand, that is, toppling the 
regime. The police used violence to crush the protests, but by sunset, it lost control 
over the situation and withdrew completely from the streets. Mubarak requested 
the army to restore order, and a curfew was imposed for the first time in decades. 
In the evening, Mubarak gave his first televised speech, where he spoke about the 
saboteurs who mingled with the Egyptian youths to destabilize the country and 
terrorize people. And although he mentioned that he “accepted the resignation” of 
the unpopular government of Ahmad Nazif (appointed by Mubarak as Prime 
Minister in 2004), thousands of Egyptians decided to encamp in Tahrir Square in 
downtown Cairo until Mubarak has resigned. 
 
When the protests began, the interest of the April Movement’s and Khalid Said’s 
pages was to report the developments on the ground. The April Movement focused 
on exposing the brutality of the police despite the peacefulness of the protestors. 
They reported the kidnapping of activists across the country and street fighting 
between the people and the police. It emphasized the unprecedented magnitude of 
the protests and the diversity of participants who included women and old people. 
On January 25, the administrator of the page wrote: “I write to you from the 
streets of Cairo. Tens of thousands are chanting for Egypt. This is the biggest 
march in the history of the country. We have surrounded the security forces twice 
and broken their cordons. This is the most beautiful day of my life” 
(https:www.facebook.com/#!/shabab6april?sk=wall).12  
 
Following the spectacular success of the 25th of January, the April Movement 
released a statement calling for a public strike on January 26 and invited all 
activists and citizens to continue the protests until Mubarak has resigned. This was 
the first direct demand for Mubarak to step down, which they presented as the 
demand of millions of protesters. It mourned the “martyrs” who lost their lives on 
January 25 for the sake of their country, stressing that it was not going to back 
down until it realizes its goals or join them. It called people to unite against 
repression to gain their freedom, dignity and bread. On January 27, it added 
reports on more protests across the country and on the failure of security forces to 
deal with them. New posters now called people to join the ‘Friday of Rage,’ with the 
aim of “toppling the dictator”.  
                                                 
12 Most statements posted by the two Facebook pages discussed here were in Arabic. Khalid Said’s 
page occasional published statements in English. Nearly all of the statements quoted in this paper 
are translated from Arabic.  




Similarly, the success of the 25th of January made Khalid Said’s page more 
confident of the potentials of the protests, even after its administrator was 
kidnapped the following day. On January 26, it used the word ‘revolution’ for the 
first time, although it did not explicitly call for Mubarak to step down. It posted a 
statement hailing the ‘Facebook Youth’ of Egypt who demonstrated that they 
represented the true pulse of the Egyptian street. It stressed the role of the Internet 
in mobilizing the Egyptians and how the revolution, despite all restrictions, could 
still be “tweeted and shared” (https:www.facebook.com/#!/ 
note.php?note_id=197846830229145). 
 
Reporting on the first day of protests, Ahram’s main outline was, “Wide Protests 
and Disorder[,] in Lebanon.”13 A smaller report mentioned that thousands 
demanding job opportunities participated in peaceful protests in Cairo and other 
governorates. It also reported that people in Upper Egypt did not respond to the 
calls to demonstrate, but it added that in Ismailia there were slogans against the 
“state.” The Muslim Brotherhood was accused of seeking to turn people against the 
police. Another piece of news reported that the Egyptians and the police were 
exchanging “chocolates and flowers” (Ahram, 26/01/2011). Commenting on the 
events of January 26, Ahram reported the death and injury of more than a 
hundred and the arrest of a similar number of “rioters” who incited violence and 
disorder when the peaceful protests turned violent and public and private 
properties were sabotaged and vandalized. It highlighted that the Egyptian stock 
market lost some 30 billion Egyptian pounds, and quoted an Egyptian lawyer 
calling for the arrest of the leaders of the April and Kifaya Movements. The 
Muslim Brotherhood was accused again of fuming the protests to achieve political 
gains. An interview was conducted with the family of “the martyr of the Egyptian 
central security forces,” a security agent who was killed during clashes on January 
25 (Ahram, 27/01/2011).  
 
On Friday, January 28, Ahram reported that Mubarak was following news about 
the “events,” and that he would inaugurate the Cairo International Book Fair the 
following day as scheduled. It added that while there were some protests on 
Thursday in Suez calling for improving the living conditions, Ismailia and 
Alexandria were calm. Other pieces of news mentioned that protesters in Cairo 
threw stones on the police, which was chasing young members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. It highlighted that the Egyptian stock market lost 40 billion Egyptian 
pounds. It also reported that Muhammad al-Baradei arrived in Cairo and 
expressed his readiness to “lead the transitional period” (Ahram, 28/01/2011).14 
 
Finally, reporting on the events of January 28, Ahram mentioned that there were 
massive protests in Cairo and other governorates. It highlighted news about the 
escape of hundreds of prisoners, the stealing of weapons from police stations, and 
                                                 
13 Emphasis added. 
14 This piece of news must be read in light of the campaign against al-Baradei in the Egyptian state 
media, including Ahram, since he announced his desire to run for the presidency in 2010. 




the “widespread” looting and sabotaging of public and private properties, including 
the main and local headquarters of the NDP, as well as the death and injury of 
scores of Egyptians. It reported that the army was ordered to “help” the police 
impose the curfew that was announced on Friday, and that religious scholars urged 
the Egyptians in the Friday speeches to unite and reject “divisive calls” (Ahram, 
29/01/2011). 
 
On the other hand, Shuruq reported on January 26 that thousands of angry 
Egyptians took to the streets demanding “change, freedom, and justice.” An 
opposition leader, Osama al-Ghazali Harb, called for the downfall of the regime. 
The first “martyr” of the Day of Rage was killed on January 25, and the Internet 
and cell phone services were cut in some places in Egypt. The US Secretary of 
State, Hillary Clinton, described Mubarak’s regime as “stable” despite the protests 
(Shuruq, 26/01/2011). On January 27, the whole issue of Shuruq focused on the 
“second day of rage,” reporting “excessive violence and cruelty,” as well as the 
arrest of more than a 1000 persons. “Street fighting” turned Suez into a copy of Bu 
Zeid, the Tunisian city which witnessed the first spark of protests during the 
Tunisian revolution. The Association of Egyptian Writers hailed the “glorious 
uprising” of the Egyptian people, and the Copts were angry because their Coptic 
Church announced its opposition to the protests. While Europe and the US called 
on the Egyptian government to fulfill the demands of the Egyptians, Obama is 
accused by a Shuruq reporter of disregarding the anger of the Egyptians (Shuruq, 
27/01/2011).  
 
On Friday, January 28, anticipating what was going to happen the same day, 
Shuruq’s main headline read, “Friday of the Martyrs,” stressing that “The Egyptian 
people has surpassed the threshold of fear and will not back down.” Conditions in 
Suez were described as a “state of war.” Muhammad al-Baradei arrived in Cairo 
and is calling for “comprehensive and immediate change” (Shuruq, 28/01/2011). 
The following day, it reported that hundreds of thousands of Egyptians took to the 
streets on Friday, and that the Egyptian security forces lost control. Public offices 
and headquarters of the NDP were burnt down, and a number of security forces 
refused to open fire on the protesters (Shuruq, 29/01/2011).  
 
Third Stage: From Saturday, January 29, to Wednesday, February 2, 2011  
 
On Saturday, January 29, Mubarak appointed a vice-president for the first time in 
thirty years with instructions to start a dialogue with the opposition. A new 
government was sworn in a couple of days later. However, protesters remained 
encamped in Tahrir Square calling for Mubarak’s resignation. On the evening of 
Tuesday, the 1st of February, Mubarak delivered a second televised speech, where 
he acknowledged the legitimate demands of people and promised to fulfill them. 
He announced that he did not have the intention to run for the a fifth term in 
September 2011, and that he wished to spend the remaining few months of his 
term arranging for the peaceful and organized transfer of power. In an emotional 




tone, he reminded the Egyptian people that he served Egypt for over 60 years 
during peace and war, asserting that Egypt was his country, where he was born 
and where he would die.  
 
This speech created divisions among the Egyptians. A considerable segment of the 
Egyptians believed that what Mubarak offered sufficed to end the protests, and 
that the president should not be humiliated in his old age. Others, notably the 
protesters encamped in Tahrir Square, were outraged by the speech, which drew 
on the emotions of the Egyptians to give Mubarak and his regime the time to 
organize their forces and attack the protesters. Amid this division, Mubarak’s 
supporters and sympathizers gathered on Wednesday, February 2, and began to 
march to Tahrir Square. A few hours before sunset, violent clashes broke out 
between them and the Tahrir Square protesters. A number of camels and horses 
attacking the protesters appeared on the scene. By the evening, that turned into a 
full-fledged warfare, where Tahrir Square protesters were attacked by stones, 
‘white weapons’ (knives, swords, etc.), petrol bombs, and live ammunition by 
snipers from surrounding buildings. According to protesters, that was the 
bloodiest day of the revolution, where dozens of them were killed and over a 
thousand others injured. The ‘Battle of the Camel’, as it came to be known, ended 
around dawn, with the Tahrir Square protesters victorious. After this incident, 
public opinion began to sway again against Mubarak, whose downfall became a 
matter of life or death. 
 
Since access to it was only partially restored on the 2nd of February (cut on January 
28), the Internet did not play a significant role during most of this stage of the 
revolution. However, the moment it had access to its online page, the main 
concern of the April Movement was to draw off the popular sympathy from 
Mubarak. They posted video clips showing police trucks running over Egyptians, 
wondering if Mubarak’s speech sufficed to erase these scenes from the Egyptian 
memory. They published a poster presenting Mubarak with the blood of the 
Egyptians covering his eyes and mouth, warning him that no matter what he did, 
he would eventually step down and be brought to justice. From now on, the 
Movement referred to the protests as “the revolution of the Egyptian youth” that 
was supported by the Egyptian people.  
 
On Sunday, January 30, Ahram was filled with reports about widespread “chaos 
and looting,” side by side with reports about the resumption of “normal life” in 
some parts of Egypt. The army demands people to respect the curfew, and Muslim 
religious scholars urge the Egyptian youths to protect the security of Egypt 
(Ahram, 30/01/2011). The following day, it focused again on disorder and the lack 
of security, for which the Ministry of the Interior is explicitly blamed. It reported 
that ‘popular committees’ (which were formed by Egyptians to protect their 
families and properties) were “helping the authorities” restore order (Ahram, 
31/01/2011). When news about the new government was announced, Ahram 
reported that the Egyptians were “competing” to restore security and clean the 




streets. Losses in Alexandria were reported to amount to 14 billion Egyptian 
pounds due to instability and insecurity (Ahram, 01/02/2011). Huge protests 
calling for change are reported on Wednesday, February 2. On Thursday, “millions 
of Egyptians” are reported to have taken to the streets in support for Mubarak. 
Covering the “Battle of the Camel”, Ahram wrote that there were clashes between 
the protesters and Mubarak’s supporters, adding that the Egyptian army urged all 
people to go to their homes. Political parties accepted dialogue with the regime, 
while the youths praised Mubarak’s speech that met their expectations (Ahram, 
03/02/2011).  
 
Shuruq began its coverage of this period by announcing that “Mubarak is backing 
down and the Egyptian people are advancing.” The slogan of all the protesters 
became, “The people want to bring down the regime.” The Egyptian army ensured 
people that its goal was to secure them, and popular committees were formed to 
protect the “revolution” (Shuruq, 30/01/2011). On January 31, it reported the 
proposals of the Vice-President to settle the situation, as well as al-Baradei’s 
assertion that Mubarak would be gone in a few days. Pope Shenouda, patriarch of 
the Coptic Church, made a phone call to Mubarak and expressed his support to 
him, whereas the US called for the immediate transfer of power in Egypt (Shuruq, 
31/01/2011). 
 
On the 1st of February, Shuruq emphasized the assertion of the Egyptian army that 
it fully understood the legitimate demands of the Egyptian people and its 
commitment to not use force against the protesters. It also emphasized that the 
new government included 15 ministers from the dismissed Nazif government 
(Shuruq, 01/02/2011). Contrary to Ahram, it reported “widespread rejection” of 
Mubarak’s speech, without mentioning divisions among the Egyptians in the front 
page (Shuruq, 02/02/2011). Commenting on the “Battle of the Camel”, it described 
Mubarak as Nero, the Roman Emperor who set fire to Rome, and highlighted 
attempts of the NDP to thwart the revolution (Shuruq, 03/02/2011).  
 
Fourth Stage: From Thursday, February 3, to Friday, February 11 
 
This relatively long stage begins with a stalemate after the “Battle of the Camel”, 
with the protesters encamped in Tahrir Square requesting Mubarak’s resignation. 
On February 10, Mubarak made one last attempt to hang on to power. In his last 
televised speech, he transferred his authorities as president to the Vice-president, 
but this speech turned more people against him. The long awaited moment came 
on Friday, February 11, when the Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces 
met without Mubarak. Although that was a clear sign that something serious was 
taking place, jubilation started only when the Vice-President announced 
Mubarak’s resignation.  
 
During this stage, the concern of the Facebook pages that the regime may 
manipulate popular feelings to foil the revolution continued to guide their online 




activities. Speaking as the sons and daughters of the Egyptian families and 
representatives of the Tahrir Square youths, the April Movement pointed out that 
the regime was only seeking to gain time by calling for a national dialogue, while it 
was massacring and arresting Egyptians. It hailed those who refused to end the 
encamping, describing them as “Free Egyptians” who were not deceived by the 
regime’s maneuver to keep Mubarak in power. Additionally, it took much interest 
in describing life in Tahrir Square, probably to encourage people to visit it. Tahrir 
Square was described as a “virtuous city,” where Muslims and Christians took 
turns to protect each other during prayers, where people were not discriminated 
against on the basis of religion or gender, where no crimes took place, and where 
spirits were high and hope was infinite. Everyone was Egyptian and was willing to 
sacrifice their lives for the sake of their country and their compatriots, and 
everyone was confident that the future would be bright. When the big moment 
came and Mubarak resigned, the two Facebook pages were constantly updating 
their members and visitors on the reaction of people in Tahrir Square. Scenes and 
videos of huge crowds waving the Egyptian flag, chanting national songs, and 
dancing in jubilation were posted and circulated.  
 
Ahram’s coverage of this stage was a continuation of its coverage of the events of 
the 3rd and 4th of February. It reported that the Egyptian street was divided 
between those who supported and those who opposed Mubarak. It highlighted 
reports about protests and statements by public figures supporting Mubarak and 
calling for stability to stop the bleeding of the Egyptian economy (Ahram, 
04/02/2011). Two days later, it reported that the “majority” supported the 
immediate end of protests, which was also emphasized by religious scholars in 
their speeches in mosques, highlighting the warning by the Vice-President that 
Mubarak’s resignation would lead to chaos. Editorials discussed attempts by Iran, 
the Muslim Brotherhood, and the US to take over the revolution (Ahram, 5 and 
6/02/2011). On February 7, it reported that the US stopped pushing for the 
immediate transfer of power, adding that the Vice-President agreed with 
representatives of the Egyptian youths that Mubarak should remain in office until 
the end of his term. The streets had now gone back to normal, and protesters in 
Tahrir Square were shouting “against Iran” (Ahram, 07/02/2011). The following 
day, Ahram spoke for the first time about the “revolution” and the “martyrs” of the 
“protests” (Ahram, 08/02/2011). The Vice-President’s warning that Egypt had to 
choose between dialogue or face a military coup was highlighted again (Ahram, 
09/02/2011). When Mubarak resigned, Ahram announced, “The people have 
brought down the regime. The revolution of the youths has forced Mubarak to go. 
The Egyptians are celebrating” (Ahram, 12/02/2011).  
 
During this stage, Shuruq highlighted the “marches of anger” everywhere in Egypt, 
as well as the insistence of the Tahrir Square protesters to continue their 
encamping until Mubarak’s resignation (Shuruq, 04/02/ 2011). On February 5, it 
reported “the beginning of the week of perseverance” (Shuruq, 05/02/2011). Most 
reports in the next couple of days were on the “revolution of rage” or the 




“revolution of the 25th of January” (Shuruq, 6 and 7/02/2011). On February 9 and 
10, it reported that millions of Egyptians joined the protesters (Shuruq, 9 and 
10/02/2011), and on February 11, it reported that “Mubarak refuses to abdicate” 
and highlighted the sweeping outrage that his speech caused among the Egyptians. 
It also highlighted the assertion of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces that it 
supported the legitimate demands of the people (Shuruq, 11/02/2011). On 
Saturday, February 12, Shuruq announced, “The people have won. The revolution 





Some conclusions can be drawn from this presentation of selected Egyptian media 
outlets during the 18 days of the 2011 Egyptian revolution. The Internet-based 
social networks with their huge membership succeeded in setting off the first spark 
of the revolution.15 However, despite many similarities between the two Facebook 
pages discussed here, each had its own character. The April Movement was more 
‘political’ in tone than Khalid Said’s page. As has been pointed, the former was 
already engaged with the Egyptian street in various parts of Egypt for three years 
before the revolution. Khalid Said’s page focused its mobilizing effort primarily on 
the Internet, calling it “electronic struggle.” It also stressed the peacefulness of the 
protests even if violence was used by the police, whereas the April Movement 
warned the police that if violence was used, the consequences would be tragic.16 
Finally, whereas Khalid Said’s page sought to raise hope of the possibility of 
change, the April Movement sought to create and enhance confidence in the 
possibility and imminence of change. 
 
The success of the online networks resulted out of several reasons. The Internet is 
used in Egypt primarily by young people belonging to middle- and upper-class 
groups in urban centers. However, the presence of large numbers of Internet cafés 
has made it possible for those without private access to nevertheless use the 
Internet. Furthermore, although some Egyptian youths were politically active 
before the revolution (but not necessarily members of official political institutions 
such as political parties), thousands of members of these online networks were 
typically not actively involved in political life, as became evident when the identity 
of some of them was revealed after Mubarak’s abdication. This factor, together 
with the fact that these youths were able to communicate without knowing much 
about each other, made it possible for them to work together without religious or 
ideological barriers. Furthermore, because of the difficulty of monitoring them and 
the anonymity of their members, these online networks provided youths with a 
                                                 
15 The political use of the Internet in Egypt has a relatively long history. For years Egyptian bloggers 
have presented and discussed various political, social and economic grievances, covered 
demonstrations and elections, and exposed the brutality of the security forces. 
16 Violence did take place during the Egyptian revolution. However, it is not yet known who was 
responsible for setting fire to the headquarters of the NDP, police stations and government offices 
in various parts of Egypt.  




sphere where they could express and discuss ideas, share information and 
formulate demands with unprecedented freedom. Modern technology, particularly 
cell phones, has made it possible to access these networks anywhere and anytime 
(unless the Internet service is cut off by the government, which did take place for a 
few days during the revolution). Live coverage of events was provided, and 
eyewitness reports, pictures, and videos were exchanged, depriving the state of the 
opportunity to manipulate facts before they are published and empowering 
citizens both as actors and as sources of news.  
 
All these factors reflect the potentials of the Internet as a “pull” and consumer-
controlled media, where receivers of the message act on the information they 
receive. Some scholars (for example, Toulouse, 1998: 4; Kedzie and Aragon, 2002: 
108; Abramson, Arterton and Orren, 1988: 32-65) have noted that these 
advantages of the Internet as a means of communication enhance freedom, 
participation and the exchange of ideas.17 These potentials of the Internet were 
realized by online activists. The administrator of Khalid Said’s page spoke about 
how the Egyptian government used to mislead people by its media and how 
modern technology has made it possible for people “to see the reality of their 
situation.” However, although he believed that Facebook was not going to change 
Egypt, political, social and economic awareness, strong nationalist feelings, 
enthusiasm for change, and knowledge of modern technology provided Egyptian 
youths with what they needed to create and boost hope in a country where the 
majority of the population seems to have been despaired of the possibility of any 
positive change.  
 
As for the press, the coverage of the two newspapers selected can be analyzed in 
light of how they relate to the online networks. Ahram chose to ignore these 
networks altogether, focusing instead on employing various strategies to obstruct 
the revolution. One strategy was abstaining from reporting news about the 
protests, most likely to avoid providing them with free publicity. Simultaneously, it 
sought to deflect the attention of people from entertaining the possibility of a 
popular uprising in Egypt similar to the Tunisian revolution. To do this, it focused 
on a terrorist attack that shocked Egypt on New Year’s Eve and on how that 
indicated that Egypt was targeted by foreign actors seeking to destabilize it. After 
the first few days of the revolution, it began to focus on the losses of the Egyptian 
stock market, and sought to intensify the feeling of insecurity and fear by 
emphasizing news about runaway prisoners and widespread looting and violence. 
Its allegations that the Muslim Brotherhood was encouraging people to defy the 
authorities obviously sought to lead the Egyptians to believe that the protests were 
in fact an Islamist coup. 
 
                                                 
17 It is worth investigating how public opinion is shaped in these social networks. Unlike in other 
media, such as newspapers which can shape public opinion over a relatively long period of time, it 
seems that public opinion is shaped in rather than by online networks over a relatively short period 
of time and by significantly larger number and greater diversity of participants.  




Moreover, following Mubarak’s dismissal of the unpopular Egyptian government 
on January 31, Ahram began to blame the Ministry of the Interior for the 
deteriorating situation in Egypt, most likely to indicate that the problem was not 
the regime itself, but rather the security forces that abused their authorities and 
bullied the Egyptian people. The language that Ahram used was also indicative of 
its objective; for example, it referred to the victims of the police during the 
revolution as martyrs, while the protesters were referred to as rioters who incited 
violence and instability. Additionally, it frequently employed outright fabrication 
of news and manipulation of facts. For example, it reported that the Egyptians 
were exchanging “chocolates and flowers” with the police officers on January 25 
when violent clashes occurred. It spoke of the restoration of normal life in Egypt 
when millions were encamped and protesting almost everywhere in Egypt. It 
alleged that there was a consensus among the Egyptians that the protests should 
end after Mubarak’s second televised speech on the 1st of February, while there was 
a division in public opinion that soon turned against Mubarak after the “Battle of 
the Camel”. It is no surprise, then, that the coverage of Ahram and other state-run 
media reminded people of the Six Day War in 1967, when the Egyptian media 
reported that the Egyptian forces were destroying the Israeli army, while the exact 
opposite was taking place. 
 
Shuruq, however, provided an alternative coverage. Evidently seeking to 
encourage and boost the popular uprising, it provided extensive coverage of the 
online networks and reported news about the protests even before they actually 
started. They reflected and stressed the optimism of the organizers in the 
possibility of a popular uprising in Egypt similar to the Tunisian revolution. 
During the revolution, it referred to the victims of the protesters as martyrs and 
hailed the protesters as heroes. It emphasized the international condemnation of 
the crackdown on the protesters and the calls of some world leaders for Mubarak 
to step down. It highlighted the growing popular dissatisfaction with the regime 
and the frustration and rage that each of Mubarak’s televised speeches caused. 
Throughout the 18 days of the revolution, its reports sought to increase the popular 
feeling that change was already underway, and that all was needed was 
perseverance. Contrary to Ahram, Shuruq presented to its readers a picture of an 
evil, cunning regime that was on the verge of collapse by the heroism and bravery 
of a defenseless people.  
 
The frames most useful for the present discussion are the mobilization and 
demobilization frames. According to Charlotte Ryan (1991:70-74), mobilization 
frames are characterized by a number of features, the first of which is the collective 
definition of issues, which requires emphasizing their social character and 
stressing collective responsibility as well as suggesting solutions on a structural 
level. This social definition of the events was emphasized by the Facebook pages 
and Shuruq newspaper which presented the events as a popular uprising aiming at 
collective benefit. They also emphasized that the change must be structural, i.e. 
changing the nature of the regime itself (which required its actual downfall) and its 




relationship with people. Ahram sought to present the events on a significantly 
narrower scale. The protests were organized and led by special groups and did not 
reflect public opinion. In the middle of the revolution, it put the blame on certain 
institutions or individuals (such as the Ministry of the Interior) and sought to 
market solutions that did not touch the core of the regime itself (such as changing 
a government or appointing a vice-president).  
 
A second feature of mobilization frames is conflict. That is, a sharp distinction 
must be made between one side, ‘us,’ and a clearly identified challenger, ‘them.’ In 
our case, independent media distinguished clearly between ‘us’ – the people – and 
‘them’ – the regime with all its institutions and symbols. Ahram, however, 
obfuscated, probably deliberately, the identity and nature of the two sides of the 
events. At times these two sides were the state and the people against rebels, or the 
state and people against certain officials or institutions, or the state against 
internal and external forces that sought to lead it to collapse, etc.  
 
A third feature of mobilization frames is the “moral appeal,” which can play a 
significant role in mobilization by portraying acts against the challenger as, 
according to Ryan, “unjust, unfair, plain wrong, and violates basic social standards 
in some regards … [as well as] shared moral principles.” Indeed, the independent 
media discussed here highlighted the peacefulness and virtuousness of the 
protestors,18 and contrasted this with the brutality and wickedness of the regime. 
Ahram, in contrast, emphasized violence and disorder, for which protesters were 
directly or indirectly blamed.  
 
In the end, it must be noted that the role of the Internet was not limited to online 
networks. Bloggers and electronic journalism played a significant role before and 
during the revolution by their extensive coverage of the protests and their exposure 
of police brutality. Satellite channels also played an important role. In fact, they 
may have played the most important role when the Internet and phone services 
were cut in Egypt. A huge screen was provided to the protesters encamped in 
Tahrir Square. A radio channel was created to broadcast news and mobilizing 
songs linked with glorious moments in the modern Egyptian history. All these 
media contributed in various ways to the downfall of what appeared to be one of 
the most stable dictatorships in the Middle East, and to the success of a revolution 




                                                 
18 See how Tahrir Square was described by the April Movement in page 16 above. 
19 According to Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993:116), all movements need validation from some media 
outlets. In their view, “[r]eceiving standing in the media is often a necessary condition before 
targets of influence will grant a movement recognition and deal with its claims and demands. 
Conversely, a demonstration with no media coverage at all is a nonevent, unlikely to have any 
positive influence either on mobilizing followers or influencing the target.”  
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